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Working with Values: Software of the Mind

*A Systematic and Practical Account
of Purpose, Value and Obligation
in Organizations and Society.*

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**The Original Reference Text as used by Consultants in
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Chapter 4

Exploring Value

Purpose is an essential concept for understanding and determining both personal and social action. In the last chapter, it became apparent that certain statements of purpose are statements of value. The focus in this chapter is on values themselves: what they are and how they differ from level to level.

In examining values and talking to people about what they mean by values, we uncovered yet more confusion and muddle. As with purpose, value is used in widely varying ways both in everyday life and in the academic literature. For many people the notion of ‘developing values’ sounded meaningless or esoteric. When it is explained that a value is what is important to you, that social groups are built round what their members think is important, that what anyone thinks is important changes over time, that each of us can and must decide for ourselves what is important, then developing values suddenly makes sense. It is something we all do all the time.

INTRODUCING VALUES

The idea of essentially different types of value in a hierarchy is not commonly appreciated. The usual distinctions are dichotomous. Value is divided into: moral values (like honesty) versus non-moral values (like driving a car); or values as ends (like truth) versus values as means (like fair prices); or primary self-evident common values (like education) versus secondary contentious sectional values (like rote learning); or abstract values (like theories) versus concrete values (like property); or spiritual religious values (like hope) versus temporal secular values (like shopping). Unfortunately, as we found in the conventional two-fold division of purpose, the merit of simplicity of such analyses does not compensate for their frequent inadequacy in practice.

In Chapter 3, I identified five distinct types of purpose and showed that they are hierarchically related. The function of the hierarchy, when descending, could be seen to be the progressive translation of values into action — until a level precisely defining necessary tasks is reached. A way to appreciate types of value is to

recreate the hierarchy from the bottom up. As one level succeeds another ascending the hierarchy, we can observe how different forms of purpose have the quality of values, and how the value element becomes progressively more purified. In other words, the dominance and particularity of purposes at one level can be overcome by a higher more value-imbued conception of purpose — until a level of pure value is reached which all can share in all situations.

So we will now recapitulate the hierarchy from the perspective of value starting with pure means. *Tactical objectives* (L-1) specify finite tangible results to be produced to a time deadline. These purposes, inherent in any action at all, are devoid of intrinsic value and make little or no sense unless they are clearly steps towards a desired achievement. Precisely what is to be achieved is contained in the specification of a strategic objective. *Strategic objectives* (L-2) specify desired feasible outcomes which maximize impact. But any given outcome is never desired by all people affected by it. So any strategy needs to take into account a variety of values. Ensuring that progress is governed by preferred values is achieved by specifying internal priorities. *Internal priorities* (L-3) specify relative preferences or degrees of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use. Ideally, they quantify the degree of emphases to be given to each possibility. However, not everything is of interest to whomever owns and sustains the endeavour as a whole. So boundaries to possible choices need to be set by specifying principal objects. The *principal objects* (L-4) specify those activities which define the identity of the endeavour. In doing so, they demarcate activities and can create organized bodies. However, no activity or organization will survive for long unless it is supported by the surrounding community. Wider social endorsement can be obtained by specifying and using social values. *Social values* (L-5) specify actualizable freely shared community-based values which meet needs and keep open possibilities for action. These values justify social institutions, organizations and activities of all sorts without being tied to any particular one.

The Need for Higher Levels

The framework of five levels just listed is an ends-means hierarchy in that purposes within each level answer the question ‘why?’ to purposes within the level below, and ‘how?’ to purposes within the level above. This raises the interesting question of what happens at the top and the bottom. Is the hierarchy endless? The answer is: No. We noted in the last chapter, that we cannot sensibly ask ‘how?’ of a tactical objective. But asking ‘why?’ of social values leads to a quite different result.

It is apparent that social values — the values which overtly drive activities without defining or limiting them — may themselves be developed, debated and promoted independently of action. That is to say, we can intelligently ask the question ‘why?’ of social values. For example, why is it that we all need and seek such specific and practical values as schools for our children? or efficiency in our public services? or unpolluted air? Such questions must be answered by appealing to something purposive, but yet more general abstract and explanatory than the social values themselves. This purpose or value would be logically found in a level above L-5.

Of course, practically-minded people do not usually question social values. Nevertheless, in discussion, they can and do justify their values by offering a rationale. Let us take, for instance, the social value of education for children. Pushing someone to justify education might lead them to say that it is needed to get a good job, or that going to school is the basis for learning to be a good citizen, or that education allows the child to develop itself. Any one of these (or other) notions could be elaborated further into a full-blooded defence of education.

What this man-in-the-street is offering is a theory about why education is a social need worth holding. And what is this theory if not a value? I will be calling explanatory ideas or theories a *value system*. Such values may look much like social values, but in fact they are debatable ideas which offer understanding and explanation — not self-evident needs promoting general action.

A more philosophically-minded person might well have given a different sort of answer. While believing that education is important because of its link to social ideals like employment, citizenship, and self-development, the second person might go further. This quasi-philosopher could also claim that education for children is good because it is the road to their experience of Truth and Freedom—things which are, and have always been, of inestimable value. I will be calling such values *ultimate values*.

Social values and all lower level purposes are eventually justified in terms of value systems and ultimate values. These two highest values are purposes in so far as they identify a future state of affairs and so contribute to bringing it about. However, the endpoint they specify is theoretical and abstract. The result is two levels of pure value above the five-level hierarchy of purpose making it in all a seven-level structure.

This two-level value context is what makes values and activity meaningful. In other words, values here endow life with a sense of rightness and goodness, and govern all social relations. And yet, such values do not need to be specified, and may not even be consciously considered when taking action. In firms, these higher values tend to be defined when issues of principle, ideals, culture and vision emerge.

Summarizing the Pure Values

The finding that two further higher levels of purpose can be elicited beyond the social value level is confirmed by a review of the literature on values. *Value systems* (L-6) and *ultimate values* (L-7) have similar properties to the lower five levels of purpose, and a comparable but slightly modified and re-ordered account is provided in the next two sections. A summary of the two higher levels of pure value, including synonyms, is provided below. These two levels are placed in the context of the others in Master-Table 2.

L-6: Value systems are interlinked or complex valued ideas ordering understanding within a social domain. Although they are frequently used to justify enduring values and activities, they can be entirely hypothetical and divorced from existing society and current activities. Common synonyms include: belief, principle, assumption, ideal, theory, ideology, paradigm, intellectual framework, school of thought, doctrine. Value systems are the basis for socialization and social division, creating intense loyalty amongst adherents and negativity in others. The typical format for their expression is: “We all believe and want ..X..” or “We believe X and so we want ..Y,Z..” — where X is the value system and Y and Z are directly implied social values or endeavours. For example, X might be efficiency, and Y and Z might be routinization and automation of jobs. Being so partial and diverse, value systems do not provide absolute justification, so a higher level is required.

L-7: Ultimate values are universally accepted and eternally pursued states of being. They can only be fully appreciated by people as individuals who, when activated by them, feel uplifted and inspired. Although utterly abstract immutable and experiential, their

articulation is culture-bound. The typical format for their expression is: “The human race has always striven for..X.” — where X is the ultimate value. Typical ultimate values are peace, compassion and truth. If we say that people have always sought efficiency in the use of limited resources, then efficiency is being elevated to an ultimate value. Common synonyms include: universal values, being values, meta-values, absolute values and inspirational values. Ultimate values are the source of the sense of good and evil, and are used to describe deities. Ultimate values can be defined in terms of each other and are the final social justification for hypothetical ideas, actual values and activities, so no higher level of purpose either exists or is needed.

Each of the higher levels will now be described in detail. On this basis, I will clarify the nature and properties of values. The upper five levels of purpose, which are all values, will then be re-examined from this new perspective.

L-6: VALUE SYSTEMS

Nature. A value implies that something is important: the something here is an idea. Value systems are complex valued ideas used to order understanding within their particular domain, and so justify social values and endeavours. Such ideas are sometimes called ideals. A value system, as the name suggests, implies that even single ideas are always complex and analysable as an inter-linked or inter-related set. The idea of customer-responsiveness, for example, includes ideas of promptness, helpfulness, service, courtesy and so on. Value systems are to be found (or can be elicited or pieced together) in all societies and enduring social groups, in all academic disciplines, in all industries, and indeed in all domains of human interest and activity.

Ideas are always present even if the people involved are unaware of their nature and force. It is impossible in practice, to approach any domain of activity if we do not assimilate and use certain ideas associated with it. If nothing is available, then we turn away or ignore the domain as meaningless or irrelevant, until those intellectually more adventurous souls blaze a trail of thinking for others to follow.

A variety of labels for value systems have come into use. Single or loosely connected ideas are often called principles, beliefs, assumptions or ideals. Ideas lends themselves to being systematized. Ideologies are systematized value systems. Some now use this term beyond its political sense to include purposive thinking and values inherent within any social sphere of action.¹ The term philosophy may be used in a similar way (e.g. the philosophy of the Steiner system of education).

School of thought is a general phrase capturing these more rationally organized value systems. Formally structured systems of ideas are also known as theories, paradigms, or doctrines. So mathematics, behaviourism and Christianity are all built around value systems. Because a value system is believed in by its adherents, it may be referred to as a belief system. Cultures and cults embody value systems and much else, but sometimes these terms are used to refer solely to the value system.

Scientific Empiricism: The empirical value system places primary significance on data and regards the freely given widespread agreement of others to the factuality of that data as crucial. So the amassing and organizing of ever more facts is good in itself. Other valued ideas in the system include: quantification; precise measurement using a universal standard unit; objectivity and verifiability; reduction of complexity; simple experiments; well-structured problems; what exists now rather than in the past or future. The value system particularly rejects ideas and reasoning (even though data itself is an idea), the incorporation of subjectivity through values or intuition, and direct approaches to complexity. Although all scientists have a respect for facts, some find empiricism congenial, while others find it abhorrent. There is no formal or official statement of precisely what the empirical value system is.

Ex. 4.1

Value systems are theoretical. Comprehensive and organized value systems define a complete and coherent approach to understanding ‘how’ and ‘what’ to value within their domain. Value systems validate achievement and are experienced as the principal source of value within any domain, more important even than social values.

Value systems are accepted or rejected as a whole. In certain times, places or arenas, a single or overwhelmingly dominant value system is found. More frequently in today’s complicated world, there are a multiplicity of value systems, all apparently equally valid. Where pluralism prevails and a number of value systems co-exist within a domain, then each value system necessarily appears to be distinctive and largely incompatible with the others.

Value System Clashes: a) Within the mental health field, psychoanalysts and psychiatrists adhere to fundamentally different models of mental illness. In practice, they often have difficulty collaborating in the way that would benefit the patient. b) In politics, a variety of ideologies are well recognized e.g. fascist, conservative, liberal, socialist, communist. These represent competing views on societal government, and give rise to parties whose representatives fight each other in elections, in the legislature, and sometimes in civil war. c) In scientific inquiry, often claimed to be non-ideological by its practitioners, many distinct competing approaches have been identified (such as empiricist, rationalist, hypothesis-testing, and

systemicist) with each scientist being primarily socialized into just one and hostile towards some or all of the others. d) Religions embody value systems and provoke intense inter-group conflict despite their promotion of ultimate values like peace love and harmony. Ex. 4.2²

Value systems, such as those in Ex. 4.2, structure what is to be desired and what aspects of reality are to be transformed. They therefore include assumptions that define reality broadly. By indicating what is important and what can be ignored, value systems affect perception, creating blind spots and areas of intense lucidity. Although value systems need not be formulated for action, their significance cannot be ignored. Lying beyond social values, value systems are an extraordinarily powerful controlling influence.

Motivation. The deep court of appeal in each person is the integrity of their identity. A person's identity is built up through identifications, and value systems are incorporated through identification. Because value systems become part of a person's identity, they are revealed in spontaneous personal expressions during activity. Once a value system is internalised, it becomes a source of obligation and a deep compulsion. The individual is obliged to adhere to the value system and (as it feels) the value system obliges the person to develop and apply certain values. So inner authority or obligation is the characteristic type of motivation that corresponds to this level of purpose. This motivation is social in nature, in that it stems from the internalization of external systems of authority. The inner sense of obligation controls and justifies action. Its compulsory quality makes it the mainspring of ethical living.

Adherents repetitively proclaim their support for their value system as a way of reaffirming themselves, and generating their inner commitment to action of a particular sort. Too often, they go further and deny the value and validity of alternative ways of thinking and acting — even to the point of desiring and pursuing the annihilation of alternatives and their adherents (cf. Ex. 4.2). Value systems are therefore identity sustaining for an individual person and powerfully integrative for groups of like-minded people. Simultaneously, they are intensely divisive between adherents of different systems.

Uses. Value systems are essential for developing new social values and opening up new domains of thought and action. They are a source of attraction and foster intense adherence and belief. There is a general unease with this. Before a value system becomes an idea, theory or paradigm that is universally taken for granted, it puzzles people and seems too extreme, too simplistic, too one-sided to the outsider — however

notable the spokesman, however persuasive the arguments, and however numerous the adherents.

Value systems should be seen as an aid to clarifying and modifying existing values, as an orientation to a new area, and as a spur to commitment and confidence. In these latter roles, they are essential, being both informative and sensitising.

For example, academic debates in the 1960s between the 'muddling through' incremental pragmatists and the grand planning rationalists usefully exposed assumptions in public policy-making. In the process, the implications of different ways of deciding issues were clarified.³ Similarly the debates generated by the publication of Salman Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses*, not only exposed differences in the value assumptions of Western and Islamic cultures, but also provided the possibility for communication and rapprochement.⁴

Value systems have many other functions. They are essential for inner convictions and developing new approaches to social problems. They are the basis of individuality for people, social groups and enterprises of all sorts. They give coherence to social movements and provide a rationale for causes and crusades.

Articulation. Value systems do not require to be articulated for action to occur. Nevertheless value systems can be perceived underlying purposes which are deliberately set and pursued. Value systems do need to be articulated in situations of challenge or major change. Single ideas are easy to affirm, but a set is needed to properly appreciate, use and defend any idea.

A person may be responsible for whether or not he enters or remains in a domain or identifies with one or other of the value systems on offer. But no person can be made responsible for ideas in the value system held by all in a social group. In any case, most people take their value systems for granted, and the idea that alternative systems might be valid seems improbable to them.

Where the value system is implicit, valued ideas can be deduced from natural behaviours and unguarded or quasi-official pronouncements by the people involved. If social groups are to understand each other, then such elucidation is needed. Exploration of value systems is generally left to those with a scientific or philosophical bent, or with a natural orientation to conceptualizing value concerns. They may be called theoreticians. If the emphasis is on producing or overseeing action, then ideological thinkers might be a preferable label (given that the notion of ideology is not to be restricted to politics and economics). In religions, theologians analyse and develop their value system. The better academics develop theories all the time without thinking

of them as value systems or even as social products. But their theories can have major social consequences — finance for more investigation, publications, conferences, employment of research staff, promotion. The ideas might even be used by industry or governments.

Popperism: Karl Popper articulated a particular approach to how knowledge developed and science worked. He vigorously propounded his ideas and was not averse to scientists taking them as a manifesto for deciding what was proper science and what was merely masquerading as such. The flow of research funds and the development of careers are determined by such decisions. Popper's ideas are therefore a value system and not socially neutral. Other useful inquiring systems have lacked such an effective proponent in recent times and have suffered because of this. **Ex. 4.3**

Omission. When domains lack valued ideas and theories, society suffers. Recognition of existing communal needs alone is generally insufficient for progress. Some understanding is essential to determine associated or new needs, and to know what to do about needs. Without any understanding, a sense of uncertainty and helplessness develops. So the old saying is true: there is nothing as practical as a good theory. Specification and reflection on ideas that define us and our activities is regarded as an exercise for intellectuals rather than ordinary people. Yet the beliefs that people live by are important for them and everyone else. If there is no reflective awareness, there can be no deep personal or social change.

Cooperation is weak and ineffective in organizations which lack shared beliefs. If in addition the significance of value systems is neglected, conflicts between different groups escalate and cannot be handled sensibly. In banking, for example, retail bankers and merchant or investment bankers use quite different values to handle quite different types of activity. Calling both groups bankers is possible, but attempting to merge them within a single division is liable to fail. Similarly, the value system of information specialists differs markedly from that of operational managers. Misunderstanding and criticism between these groups is rife with the result that many information technology projects overspend, seriously under-perform, or fail utterly.

Occasionally a person may enter a new domain without the necessary socialization. Then their activity is likely to be socially chaotic, incoherent and unacceptable until a tolerated value system has been internalized and adopted. The socialization process is unavoidable if the person wishes to remain in the domain.

Doctors and Managers: Involving doctors in the management of the hospitals of the National Health Service

has been a long and difficult struggle. Doctors distrust managers because their value system is so alien. Managers focus on money, service profile, new technology, markets or catchments, competition, political priorities, staff satisfaction, public relations &c. Doctors focus on their own independence of action, accuracy of diagnosis, needs of individual patients, new techniques, expertise, trust, confidentiality, income, publications &c. When a doctor becomes a manager, he slowly becomes re-socialized. His colleagues feel this and the doctor may then lose their confidence. Public health doctors were expected at one time to bridge the divide between medicine and management, but their value system differs again. It includes community health, needs for services, research, facts and epidemiological method. Their lack of focus on health care delivery or organizational boundaries leads the profession to become estranged from both clinical doctors and health care managers. **Ex. 4.4**

Evaluation. Value systems, like social values, do not seem to lend themselves to being evaluated. For adherents, they are good: more than good — ideal; more than ideal — true. For the adherent the valued ideas define reality. For non-believers or outsiders, either the ideas seem irrelevant, devoid of content and confusing; or they are understandable but excessive, misconceived and mischievous. At worst, the value system is judged to be delusional and dangerous.

Nevertheless, a degree of detached academic evaluation is possible. This may be carried out from within the value system or from without. The task here is to articulate the valued ideas as precisely as possible, to examine their clarity consistency and coherence, to consider their congruence with reality and impact in practice, and to compare and contrast the value system as a whole with others in the same domain.

Limitation. Value systems are limited to a particular domain and fail to define a good to which all can give assent. Yet such ends are felt to exist. Being inherently partial and diverse, any value system seems to need justification. In practice, appeal is typically made to certain final ends which transcend all value systems and seem unchallengeable: ultimate values.

Value systems have an essential quality that ultimate values lack. They have to show at least some recognition of physical and social realities in order to guide people's thinking and regulate social life. In other words, they usefully deal with the utter abstraction of ultimate values. Now it is time to consider these highest abstract values.

L-7: ULTIMATE VALUES

Nature. Ultimate values are universally accepted and eternally pursued states of being. Examples include truth, beauty, compassion, goodness, order, strength,

gratitude, humour, harmony, peace, uniqueness, liberty, justice, happiness, patience, virtue, love. Such values are readily recognizable as the source of all value, and as requiring no higher justification. In recent times, ultimate values have been repeatedly rediscovered and there is now a bewildering number of synonyms including: meta-value, being value, ultimate goal, universal value, inspirational value, absolute value, existential value, spiritual value and transcendent value.⁵

Ultimate values are purposive in the sense that they represent in abstract form what needs to be realized in any worthwhile human life or human society. They express the essential basic longings of humanity, irrespective of the stage of cultural development reached, or the forms of social organization adopted. Correspondingly, their negative form represents states of being, like ugliness, chaos and injustice, which have been rejected at all times by mankind.

Ultimate values enable self-transcendence and cultural transcendence because, being experiential, they express commonality with all humanity. They cannot be tied to any particular culture, historical time, social institution, dogma, or endeavour. For example, no group or philosophy has the copyright on truth or the final say about what constitutes justice. So ultimate values merge with the essence of what reality is and what humanity can be. They are frequently conceived in spiritual terms, either as a definition of God or as God's attributes.

Motivation. The unbounded creative imagination is the inner link to ultimate values; and the characteristic form of motivation is inspiration. Meditation on a matter with the ultimate value firmly fixed in mind generates inspiration, and this inspiration powers whatever conclusion is reached. Inspiration operates on actions as well to produce deeds which are described as good, inspired or enlightened.

Inspiration is transpersonal and provides an energy which infuses lower social, individual and pre-personal forms of motivation. Together with obligation, inspiration ensures that inner energies are effectively and appropriately harnessed.

Uses. Ultimate values, when genuinely experienced, stabilize, vitalize and nourish people irrespective of their specific beliefs, cultural background or personality. Ultimate values lead to a stronger expression, clarification, amplification and validation of particular value systems and beliefs of all sorts. They bolster convictions, justify ideals, stimulate visionary designs, and power social movements.

Ultimate values are, it seems, the final justification

for all values and activities. Beauty might be called on to bolster support for literature, parks, and architecture; truth and freedom to underpin efforts to promote scientific endeavour and psychotherapy; harmony and wholeness to provide the rationale for well-managed effective organizations and racial integration. However, there is never a one-to-one connection.

The abstract notion of liberty, for example, seems to underpin many specific freedoms in a social setting: including freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of passage, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of information, and freedom of worship. Which of these could become a social value in practice would vary with the value system of a society and its circumstances. The complete openness of the ultimate value provides for the development of new and undreamed freedoms as societies evolve.

The same ultimate value may justify totally opposing value systems without discrimination. For example, harmony and wholeness might be used to justify both totalitarianism and liberalism. It follows that ultimate values, like value systems, cannot possibly provide any pointers for practical action. Indeed, the history of mankind reveals that ultimate values have been used to justify horrific behaviours: e.g. harmony has been invoked to allow racial discrimination, order to justify violent punishment, and truth to permit torture.

Articulation. Genuine contact with ultimate values is an inner state which seems to be invariably experienced as uplifting. So contact with ultimate values evokes veneration. Evil individuals correspondingly glory in negative versions like destruction, hate or disorder. The awareness and use of ultimate values, for good or evil, may be fostered in either solitary or group settings.

The manner of articulation and veneration varies between cultures and over time. For example, harmony seems especially meaningful for the Navaho Indians; while, from Aristotle onwards, happiness has been said to be the main goal of Western man. Love was the ultimate value for Jesus. However, when love re-emerged as the ultimate value in the Western youth movements of the 1960's, it was not specifically Christian.

The importance of ultimate values means that there is societal work to be done in articulating them. Artists of all types strive to evoke contact with ultimate values. And religious leaders do so too. Some psychotherapists see ultimate values as the healing force in therapy. Those who regularly make contact with ultimate values in a way that has popular appeal become spiritual leaders.

Omission. Everyone seeks goodness (or happiness

or harmony &c), whether they know it or not. Ordinary people follow Aristotle in taking this for granted. As with value systems, denial or ignorance is possible, but not omission. Nonetheless modern thinkers repeatedly dismiss ultimate values as unreal, as childish fantasy, as self-evidently mistaken, and as metaphysical nonsense.⁶ Too ambiguous, too abstract, too vague are the criticisms. My consultations with ministers of the church revealed some who repudiated ultimate values on these grounds. The degree of rejection can be intense e.g. one Christian moral theologian wrote: “To say follow love is not an ethics at all, but a refusal to take ethical problems seriously”.

Evaluation. Evaluation is not required because ultimate values are perfect. They may be simply proclaimed and affirmed without concern for justification. In the words of Mother Juliana of Norwich: “All shall be well, and all shall be well and all manner of thing shall be well.”

Distinctions between different ultimate values sometimes seem blurred. Any ultimate value may be held to include others, and sometimes one is directly defined in terms of another. “Truth is beauty, beauty truth” intuited Keats in a typical tautological affirmation.⁷ This suggests that the ultimate values are all different facets of one unified final value, absolute good, which corresponds to an ineffable sense of abstract goodness.

Closure. The hierarchy has now come to an end. Intuitively, it does not make sense to ask why of an ultimate value. It is surely meaningless to seek for a value justification beyond absolute good. If ultimate values are essentially a unity where form and content virtually coalesce, then no higher level of articulation is logically possible. The hierarchy is therefore complete, logically as well as intuitively.

God. Ultimate value, absolute goodness and associated inner experiences are usually seen as characterizing pure Being and their origin is commonly attributed to God. Such a God is Lord of (spatio-temporal) Creation and has properties like perfection, omniscience, and omnipotence. Values always polarize, so this conception of God generates a corresponding Satanic being which is evil because it epitomizes a drive for all that is bad. A higher transcendent God is recognized in the great religions in whom all opposites like good/bad or being/non-being fuse. And yet beyond that God is a nameless Godhead which cannot be conceived or described at all. These higher Conceptions might be regarded as forming the environment or context of the hierarchy of purpose and permitting its existence.

REVIEWING VALUES

Value is not so mysterious now that we have moved decisively into its realm. Valuing should not be strange to us because it is a distinguishing human capacity. Nevertheless, it was not until the 19th century that the study of value (axiology) came to be universally recognized as one of the great philosophical subjects.⁸ Now, research into value is carried out in many other disciplines as well, including psychology, anthropology, religious studies, management, sociology, economics and politics. But cross-fertilization between these disciplines is inhibited by the lack of a shared framework defining value.⁹

To design social arrangements ethically, certain things must be recognized as important, then these values must be introduced to people, and then they must act upon them. I call this process *the realization of value* in society. It implies working to develop values as well as introducing and establishing them. Developing values is a world apart from using already developed values for action. The time has now come to turn our attention to what is meant by a value, and to use the levels of purpose analysis to begin to gain a deeper understanding of values apart from their use in designing activities and organization.

We commenced from the basic self-evident notion that a value is an assignment of importance. In pursuing the different forms of purpose, several other inherent properties of any value have emerged. In brief, these inherent properties are: (a) Values indicate a preference for something by someone i.e. values exist in a *relation*. (b) To value something implies devaluing or rejecting something else i.e. values produce conflict through *polarization*. (c) Values direct endeavours and choices i.e. values are *purposes*. (d) Values are the link between our inner experience and outer reality i.e. values *personalize* things, and generate and confirm *identity*. (e) Values also generate and confirm commonality i.e. values always imply a *social group*. (f) Values orient and regulate people and activities in social situations i.e. values create *order*. (g) Finally, values are the driving force in people and society i.e. values motivate and release human *energy* in their service — at times unto death.

The types of value revealed by the study of purpose and action can now be reviewed. We have seen that ultimate values and value systems are the source or potential for having and recognizing value. The other types of purpose which have the properties of values are: social values, principal objects, and internal priorities. In other words, each level from L-7 through to L-3 may be regarded as a distinct type of value. Taken together they form a *five-level hierarchy of values*.

Strategic objectives (L-2) and tactical objectives (L-1) cannot be regarded as values because the necessary properties are lacking. They do not specify a polarized preference; they do not need to be decided by a group; and they are identity independent. Not surprisingly, simple strategies and tasks are already within the compass of computers and robots.

Comparing Levels of Value

Debates about how a value should be defined have frequently led people to fix the label of value to certain levels, and to minimize the usefulness or significance of other levels.¹⁰ So, in reviewing the five levels of value, the definitions of each level will be restated together with the *typical criticisms* which too often generate misunderstanding and unnecessary disputes. These criticisms are not valid from within the level, but appear to be valid from the viewpoint of another level. However, if one recognizes that each level implies the others, then supporting one type of value and rejecting another makes no sense at all.

As the hierarchy is descended, values are transformed and elaborated in an ever-expanding diversity. To simplify describing how values proliferate other values and purposes, I will give just two examples at each level. It should be evident from the examples that each type of value does indeed imply the types at the levels above and below it. This is the feature that makes the framework a hierarchy rather than a list.

We all tend to become more aware of values when we are enmeshed in a value conflict, arguing for our ideas and debating what is most important or best to do. Coming to terms with value conflict is an urgent social necessity. In dealing with conflict, one simple distinction must be recognized: Can all relevant positive values within a level be accepted in principle? Or: does social reality makes it necessary to exclude or reject certain otherwise desirable values?

When all values at a particular level can and should be accepted, choosing is termed *inclusive* and conflict should reduce. So value-choice at these levels tends to bring people and groups together and their effect is *integrative*. When rejection is part of valuing at a particular level, then choosing is termed *exclusive*, and conflict between people tends to heighten. Value-choice at these levels has a *divisive* effect.

My inquiry revealed that the levels alternate between being inclusive-integrative and exclusive-divisive in nature. Some argue that exclusive-divisive choosing is inherently evil.¹¹ Perhaps they hope to avoid disagreement or wish to minimize the importance of diversity.

But all the levels of value are self-evidently necessary in social life, so none should be stigmatized as evil.

Values generate conflict because the process of valuing polarizes. The object of positive valuation is good; and the object of rejection (or negative valuation) is bad. As part of this exploration of values, we will focus on the way *good* and *bad* change their meaning and quality according to the levels of value.

Ultimate values (L-7) specify universally accepted values and eternally pursued states of being. An example might be truth or justice. Ultimate values are *typically criticized* as being too vague, too ambiguous and too abstract. Proving the impossibility of catching them in a simple definition was Socrates' favourite game.

Ultimate value is *inclusive* because the various values either imply each other or are different aspects of the same thing. This seems to be so even if articulations vary and even if their equivalence is not recognized or realized. This is not to argue that a person or group should not fix its attention on liberty rather than harmony, or on compassion rather than truth. It does imply that if the value of liberty as developed at lower levels leads to serious disharmony in practice, then remonstrance in terms of the ultimate value of harmony is valid. Of course, choosing an ultimate value is meaningless unless that value is deeply experienced. Such experiences are profoundly *integrating* internally and in relation to others.

An ultimate value identifies *absolute goodness*. Ultimate values like peace or compassion represent perfection. However, absolute good and perfection exist nowhere but in the imagination. This leads to the conception of a highest ideal which is synonymous with God. Ultimate value is therefore an utterly abstract and imaginative form of goodness. The polarity of values means that it must be possible to conceive of *absolute badness* which expresses utterly abstract imaginative representations of evil. Religions recognize evil, specifically in the form of negative ultimate values like chaos or hatred, and generally as sin or impurity. Facing God is the devil or demons. The polarity is most evident in the culture of the ancient Aryans who believed in two opposing forces of Truth or Order and The Lie or Disorder, a notion which was spiritually developed in Zoroastrianism (see Ex. 4.6).

Ultimate values are a condition through and by which we exist, not something we learn or create. So goodness becomes the aspect under which we pursue whatever we pursue — even if we are mistaken in the event. Ultimate values generate the puzzle that all seek the good, yet all must clarify their minds in order to seek it. Perverted souls who dedicate themselves to evil

are in the same boat. Fortunately, to dedicate oneself to lies, hate or destruction is to make survival impossible: lies deceive the liar, hatred isolates the hater, destruction destroys the destroyer. It seems that Zoroaster may have got it right: goodness will survive. Of course, man may not.

Value systems (L-6) specify interlinked valued ideas which order understanding within a particular domain. Truth, for example, might take the form of ‘equal rights’ or ‘socialism’ in the political domain or the form of ‘facts’ or ‘empiricism’ in the domain of inquiry. Such value systems are *typically criticized* for being too extreme, too simplistic, too one-sided, too confusing, too theoretical, too blind to the facts, too invested with irrational emotions, and altogether too controlling.

Value systems are *exclusive*, because choice of one automatically rejects others in the same domain. The individual, however well-intentioned and broad-minded, cannot ride two horses. Value systems are *divisive* and create believers and non-believers. Societies usually need to sustain several conflicting value systems in domains like inquiry and politics. However, in respect of the operation of society itself or in the spiritual domain, a dominant value system may help to avoid endemic internal conflict. Unfortunately, it may also lead to xenophobia and the uncontrollable persecution of minorities. Internationally, a multiplicity of cultural value systems needs to be accepted — the alternative being total war.

Each value system is preferred by adherents to other value systems, which are seen to be bad, wrong, incomprehensible, meaningless, or unreal. Value systems (like Marxism and empiricism) are theoretical constructs which are imposed on people more or less overtly and unashamedly. Reality alone cannot invalidate a value system because the value system exists to alter reality and determine people’s perceptions of reality. So value systems identify *theoretical goodness and badness*. This theoretical quality means that actual social consequences of adhering to the ideas are held to be irrelevant. Although a religious doctrine, for example, is commonly judged in terms of its adherents’ behaviour, its quality can only be properly evaluated by study of the doctrine itself. Because value systems are so divorced from social reality, they should never be used to drive political and strategic choices directly. If they are, the result is disaster.¹²

Value systems create obligations which can never be directly or completely realized in practice. Each value system is incomplete and depends on others if social living is to be comprehensive and developing. For

example, intuitionist inquiry is based in subjectivity and inner feelings. However, in practice, intuitionists freely use information which is a product of empirical inquiry and based on objectivity and general agreement. Conversely, empirical scientists freely use intuition in determining what or when to investigate. Similarly, however market-oriented and individualist a culture and its economy may be, defence of the realm is always a social monopoly, centrally planned and collectively financed. As a final example: however complete a religious value system may be in respect of ethics or morals, it will be patently insufficient as a guide for many things from developing clothing fashions to resolving intergovernmental trade disputes.

Social values (L-5) are freely shared need-based values which serve a particular community and leave open possibilities for action. Empiricists might espouse, for instance, the value of disseminating information widely, and socialists might espouse, say, the value of helping others. Such social values are *typically criticized* for being platitudinous and vacuous truisms: like ‘motherhood and apple pie’. When a social value is new and different — access to government information or segregation of cigarette smokers — then it is viewed equally dismissively as ridiculous, impractical and unwanted. Social values (unlike value systems) lead directly to activities for their own sake, but being conceptual (like value systems) they persist irrespective of their successful achievement.

Because social values embody needs of individual people and the wider group, the rejection or complete absence of any one would cause serious harm. So many social values must be held regardless of any apparent conflicts between them. In other words, choice is *inclusive*. Social values are also *integrative*. They not only aid the willing involvement of the individual and the group, so preserving both, but also develop the individual internally and provide links between disparate people and different groups.

Lists of social values which define a complete person have been frequently compiled.¹³ A recent list includes life (health, safety, procreation &c), play (sport, work &c), aesthetic experience (music, art, cinema &c), speculative knowledge (learning, gossip, &c), sociability (friendship, family life &c), and religion. Another similar list distinguishes substantive goods like life and knowledge from reflexive goods like integrity and authenticity. Firms and charities benefit from producing their own lists (see Ex. 3.1). None of the goals or goods in such lists can be reduced to any other. Each value when focused upon seems most important.

Available information and helping others are two

examples of conceptual goods which can be directly pursued and realized in a recognizable way. They feel and are immediately relevant and, when affirmed, are expected to remain so for an indefinite future. Social values are *potential goods* because the possibilities for actualizing them are not closed off or constrained by their specification. *Potential bads* which are self-evident and capable of realization in a wide variety of ways also exist: illness, poverty, fraud, ignorance, bitterness, laziness, secrecy and neglect. The common bads in organizations include inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and inappropriateness.

Social values are situated in a unique position in the hierarchy: the lowest level of conceptual value, and the highest level where self-conscious choice and control are possible. It follows that philosophers' lists seem trite in our everyday world. People need to engage in an intuitive inner search to identify those social values that they feel they need. The value must make practical sense to them, and they must then find ways of getting others to agree. Only in harness with others can such values be properly realized. Those in charge of organizations or leading society must also realize that social values do not come from outside. They cannot be assumed from the value system or decided by an external expert: they must be developed by each individual and made acceptable within the community.

Principal objects (L-4) value the essential enduring activities which define the identity of an endeavour. They can be institutionalized and the resulting enterprise or organization is of value to those associated with it. Holding the social value of disseminating information might lead someone to become a journalist or to set up a polling organization. Holding the social value of helping others might lead someone to become a teacher or to sponsor a legal advice centre. Principal objects are always recognized as values by those involved (cf. the principal objects statement for the NHS in Ex. 3.5). The boundaries defined by the objects inevitably prevent the enterprise from meeting the full range of needs of people or society, and regularly render certain socially desirable initiatives *ultra vires*. So principal objects are *typically criticized* on the grounds that they are too constrained or too limited.

Principal objects are *exclusive*. The competitive exclusion principle (from evolutionary biology) suggests that no two individuals can operate with identical objects. If they do, one eventually eliminates the other. Businessmen recognize this phenomenon and the cleverer ones seek out and monopolize a unique niche in their market. Principal objects are linked to competencies, and excessive diversity tends to create incompatibilities rather than synergies. For example: a

publishing business is unlikely to make a success of fast-food outlets; and a heavy engineering firm does not sensibly diversify into fashion design.

When a firm selects a range of principal objects, it is necessary to guard against conflicts of interest which can interfere with success. In the 1980's, it became common for accountancy firms to earn money from firms both through providing management consultancy and also through auditing their accounts. After a few scandals where audits had not revealed serious financial problems, people started wondering if the firm's wish to please directors and gain consultancy business might be overriding their duty to protect shareholders.¹⁴

Principal objects are also *divisive* in the sense that they create insiders and outsiders. Insiders identify with or at least support the principal objects and are conscious of the choice that they make to participate.¹⁵ Outsiders, unless they are targeted to benefit, are at best tolerant of the principal objects, and may be envious of insiders.

Principal objects specify goods which can be identifiably generated or achieved. So principal objects define an *achievable good*. Because the value is deliberately specified to be bounded or limited, it prevents efforts from being diffused. Unlike a social value which opens up possibilities, principal objects close them down. If the social value of exposing injustice is relevant, a fictional film may achieve something, and so may an academic book, and so may a newspaper exposé. In all cases something good can be achieved, but this achievement is limited by the nature of film-making, academic writing, or newspaper publishing. Correspondingly, principal objects may also define an *achievable bad*. Criminal organizations illustrate the systematic pursuit of achievable bads. Their operations are typically based on activities like drug-dealing, smuggling, prostitution, extortion and gambling.

Internal priorities (L-3) specify a degree of emphasis amongst valid values or actions for immediate use. Continuing our two main examples: the journalist might personally prefer to cover society scandals rather than sporting events; and the legal advice centre might find itself forced by demand to focus on problems of racial discrimination rather than on employment or housing. Values here are *typically criticized* for being too relative, too situationally based, or too pragmatic. But an internal priority is by nature a transient value which must be adapted and changed according to the situational pressures.

Internal priorities are *inclusive* because all relevant values are held by those involved, and all possibilities should be prioritized so as to receive at least some quantum of preference. Appraisal of a problematic

situation in terms of values alone usually creates proponents and opponents in respect of any decision because someone will fail to benefit in some way. This may lead to priorities being inappropriately treated as if they were exclusive. Exclusivity leads to excessive denigration of valid choices and eventually to bitter and sometimes unhealable antagonisms which impede rather than aid the principal objects. Strategic objectives are exclusive/divisive because their choice involves defining one outcome and rejecting others. So the common difference of opinion regarding the necessary strategic objectives mistakenly leads people to view internal priorities as divisive. An internal priority, so long as it is based on constructive debate, adequate procedures and thoughtful choice, is *integrative*. (Naturally the resulting strategic choices need to recognize the different strands of opinion in some way.)

An internal priority is a *quantifiable good* because it identifies a specific and limited amount of resource assigned in a particular decision. The quantification may be expressed as an allocation of finite available time, space or money. To the opponent of a particular internal priority, the relative distribution of resource is viewed as a *quantified bad*. For example, large sums of money spent on marketing will be seen as bad by those who think that some or all of that money should be spent on product development. Costs which divert resources from the principal objects epitomize quantifiable bads. Staff and paperwork to meet government regulations are felt as bads by firms. Similarly, charities tend to see money going to necessary management costs as bad.

Evil and the Supreme Good

Misconceiving Evil. Plato taught that the business of life was the knowledge of good and evil. But what is evil? Theistic and pantheistic religions which emphasize that God and the whole of His creation are good have difficulty in accepting, explaining or defining evil. Leibniz's famous answer that this must be 'the best of all possible worlds' seems to imply that the world is full of necessary evils, a notion scathingly satirized by Voltaire in his *Candide*.

Evil is frequently described as a form of imperfection, a failure of wholeness, an exclusiveness or particularity, whilst goodness is seen conversely as perfection, wholeness, inclusiveness and transcendence. Augustine, for example, concluded that evil was lack of conformity to the creative will. Because we are all imperfect, such accounts lead to an emphasis on the discrepancy between God and man, and then, in parts of the Christian tradition, to the identification of evil with original sin.

However, it is a truism to say that each of us and mankind in general is imperfect. Remedying imperfection and relieving suffering is what the notion of social progress as a value-driven process is all about. Labelling ourselves with the term 'evil' does not help. Often this labelling is saved for more primitive forms of consciousness.¹⁶ Many, for example, would be inclined to think that human sacrifice was evil. However in communities where such rites were customary, they were carried out with much religious solemnity and were essential for social cohesion. We can reasonably assume that future observers will look back at our present society and identify some of its ethical or moral practices as evil.

Such labelling probably harms and certainly confuses. Evil must surely be defined as something worse than temporary ignorance, inevitable imperfection or current afflictions. Evil must be something which was evil in the past, is evil now, and will be evil in the future. The Bible opens with a myth in which man becomes mortal through the act of eating of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. There really should not be a puzzle about what evil is, because it is the knowledge which defines our existence. So I propose that we define evil as negative ultimate value, and locate it in the seventh level of purpose.

Distinguishing Evil. Evil as an ultimate value represents a *paradoxical drive to deny values and their significance altogether*. Evil includes the purposes that flow from this drive, and the consequences of that perverted drive. Evil may involve asserting that what is good is bad and what is bad is good, or it may mean eradicating any difference between good and bad, or it may be the deliberate generation of a bad without any compensating good. Man has a disposition, or at least the potential, to function in this way.

Nazism: The Nazi's were evil, but not because they did horrific things. They did horrific things because their value system was driven by evil. This evil involved deliberately aiming to eliminate all notions of fairness from political life, creating the notion in people's minds that all things were permitted and nothing forbidden, regarding violence and domination as proper instruments of government, substituting revenge for justice, replacing impartiality by loyalty to the party, destroying the weak, and valuing people by origins not character. Almost all those involved, including the mass of the German people, did not believe that such things were good prior to or following the Nazi period. The people colluded in the denial of their own ultimate values: this was evil and it released evil.

Ex. 4.5¹⁷

Negative ultimate values are a forceful negation of being. So it is not surprising that evil seems to thrive on dominating and dehumanizing others. Evil is character-

istically associated with uncontrolled ambition and greed.¹⁸ Greed for power is particularly dangerous. Power offers the prospect of self-glorification and of enslaving or destroying others. Power generates strife and violence, and violence or the threat of violence appears to be intrinsic to evil. Coercive power is an accompaniment of evil, because without it people tend to recoil from persistently acting against ultimate values. Violence interferes with this process by generating an excitement that prevents sensitivity, reflective thought or consideration for others.

It follows that ensuring that power is exercised fairly and beneficially lies at the heart of the ethical design of any organization or society.

Distinguishing Bad. Bad (in different guises) exists and must be tolerated at the four levels of value from L-6 down to L-3. The sad fact is that the pursuit of ultimate values invariably generates bads and causes harm. Accepting bads and balancing goods and bads is not itself evil — it is essential to social life. The amount and extent of harm that is acceptably balanced by the amount of good generated varies across time, between different social groups, and according to the situation.¹⁹ The difference between evil (as an ultimate value) and lower level bads is that evil cannot be counterbalanced by lower level goods and is genuinely intolerable.

We can illustrate the difference between what is evil and what is bad by distinguishing, for instance, between lying as an ultimate value, and lying as part of a value system, or as a social value, principal object or internal priority. The white lie is the trivial result of a situation in which avoidance of unnecessary embarrassment is given priority over plain speaking. Longer term policies to lie are also evident amongst religionaries. Many thinkers resorted to deceit and dissimulation to cope with the religious persecution and intellectual intolerance of the 16th and 17th centuries.²⁰ Lying, or disinformation, is a principal object of espionage services in most countries. To lie could even become a necessary social value for people living and working in the civil service of a repressive tyrannical state where informers are everywhere and frankness leads to torture and punishment. In cultures like the Palau, which are surely not evil, lying is part of the value system.²¹ At none of these levels is lying wholly good. Still, as long as a lie is not being justified by the ultimate value of falsehood, evil is contained. If, however, lying is held as an ultimate value, then one is unleashing an evil force that not only perverts all attempts at truth, but also corrupts all endeavours by sowing discord, distrust and disharmony.

Recognizing the Supreme Good. There does not seem to be a word for the specific form of ultimate

value which asserts values and the heightening of awareness of the difference between good and bad. I suggest that we call it the 'supreme good'. Supreme good and evil are not just opposing ultimate values, they are essential and irreconcilable cosmic forces which cannot coexist.

Zoroastrianism: The opposition of good and evil is the basis of all Zoroastrian mythology, theology and philosophy. Ahura Mazda (Ohrmazd), the Wise Lord, created the spiritual and material world and is the Supreme Good. The Forces of Evil are led by Angra Mainyu (Ahriman). The various Gods and Demons are both human capacities and cosmic forces. The children of Ahura are: Good Thought (Vohu Manah), Best Righteousness (Asha Vahishta), Holy Devotion (Spenta Armaiti), Desirable Dominion (Khsathra Vairya) and Immortality (Ameretat). The opposing demons are principally Fury (Aeshma) and Deceit (Azhi Dahaka), but also Jealousy, Anarchy, Lethargy, Wrongmindedness, Vile Thoughts, Presumption and Corruption. Zoroastrians do not have a problem of evil: evil is an independent fact. Although God cannot control evil, one day good will be victorious. Evil, unlike good, does not materialize but only exists as a force which parasitizes man. Certain animals which are ugly, deadly or cruel were provided by Ahura to ensure people can recognize evil. Purity laws and the avoidance of pollution bring the cosmic conflict between good and evil into the daily lives and homes of the believers. Man aids Ahura and is expected to 'overcome doubts and unrighteous desires with reason, overcome greed with contentment, anger with serenity, envy with benevolence, want with vigilance, strife with peace, falsehood with truth'. Zoroastrianism is a religion of happiness, personal responsibility and good works.

Ex. 4.6²²

Each level of value is its own unique form of good. So the supreme good implies seeking to realize values at each level in a way that befits their nature. It would seem that to call social things like (say) contraception or unemployment evil rather than bad is not wise. To stigmatize as evil politicians who must make difficult decisions between alternative bads is unfair. It could be said that inappropriate or unbalanced criticism of the good at any level, a common enough behaviour by scientists, philosophers and theologians, denies the supreme good or at least weakens its realization.

People have tried to argue for unity around a single good. However, unity is only possible in relation to ultimate values which are so abstract and experiential that they are not useful for controlling or organizing others. Elsewhere — value systems, social values, principal objects, internal priorities — we find an inherent multiplicity. There can be no such thing *in practice* as a single good for each or all of us. As we shall see in the next chapter, a society finds itself endorsing or developing particular conceptions of the good. But this is not

the same as asserting either that these are the only conceptions or that they are unequivocally good for all. Those who over-emphatically promote a single path may not be evil, but they are not recognizing the supreme good either.

TRANSITION

Values and their development are of paramount significance for improving society, for running organizations, and for personal life. Paradoxically, values, despite being about the good, appear to foster evil. Looking around, we see that values lead people to

attack alternative values and the value of others who hold these. We can agree with Hegel that “the essentially tragic fact is not so much the war of good with evil as it is the war of good with good”. Because value conflicts are part of social existence, equating all of them to a battle between good and evil denies the nature of value, and so (by definition) liberates evil.

Value conflicts occur in the process of interaction between social groups of various sorts, and in the assertion of self in the context of group living. The next chapter explores the levels of value further by examining the properties and paradoxes of group life and individual identity. ❁

Master Matrix 2

Master-
Table 2

The complete hierarchy of purpose.
Additional properties are specified in Master-Tables 1, 3, 4 and 31. See text for further explanation.

The columns headed 'Transition downwards' and 'Transition upwards' describe the logic for the evolution of the hierarchy through the limitations of each level in terms of producing results (the 'how') and in justifying choice (the 'why'). Read the columns top down and bottom up respectively.

L	Type of Purpose	Definition	Transition Downwards (The 'How?')	Transition Upwards (The 'Why?')	Nature of Choice	Motivation (Motivation Type) Core Experience	Some Typical Critisms
7	Ultimate value	A universally accepted and eternally pursued state of being.	Need to order social life and guide thinking.	Need for an absolute justification.	Inclusive-integrative	Inspiration (Transpersonal) Imagination	Too vague; too ambiguous; too abstract.
6	Value system	Interlinked valued ideas ordering understanding within a social domain.	Need for ideas to be accepted by people.	Need for an explanatory rationale.	Exclusive-divisive	Obligation (Social) Identification	Too confusing; too simplistic; too extreme; too controlling.
5	Social value	A freely shared need-based value serving a specific community.	Need to pursue specific activities competently.	Need for community endorsement.	Inclusive-integrative	Need (Relational) Intuition	Too impractical; too platitudinous; too vacuous; too obvious.
4	Principal object	An activity defining the identity of an endeavour.	Need to cope within available resources.	Need to limit possible choices.	Exclusive-divisive	Interest (Individual) Idea	Too constrained; too limited.
3	Internal priority	A degree of emphasis among valid values or actions for immediate use.	Need to produce actual impact in the situation.	Need for action to be governed by preferences.	Inclusive-integrative	Desire (Emotional) Emotion	Too situational; too pragmatic; too flexible; too inflexible.
2	Strategic objective	A desired and feasible outcome which maximizes impact.	Need to adapt to circumstances in fine detail.	Need for a sense of what is to be achieved.	Exclusive-divisive	Intention (Vital) Image	Too imprecise; too subjective;
1	Tactical objective	A precise tangible time-targetted result which is a step to a desired outcome.			Inclusive-integrative	Awareness (Sensory) Sensation	Too demanding; too specific; too mechanical.

NOTES

1. Value systems are described in the literature under the various synonyms suggested in the text. The importance of ideas as values and the interpretation of reality in such terms has been emphasized in the hermeneutic tradition. See, for example: Ricoeur, P. *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*. Ed. & transl. J.B. Thompson, London: Cambridge University Press, 1984. The significance of value systems has been evident in sociological studies, especially the critical tradition. It is now starting to be recognized in psychology e.g. Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D. & Radley, A. *Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking*. New York: Sage, 1988. Social scientists, following the lead of physical scientists, do not usually think of scientific theories as value systems. This may lead them to claim that science is non-ideological e.g. Althusser, L. *Essays on Ideology*. London: Verso, 1984. My view is that science is ideological in the sense of having a recognizable value system. Its disciplines and theories are also value systems because they fit the definition of value systems and have their properties.
2. a) The challenge to the medical model of mental illness came from: Szasz, T. *The Myth of Mental Illness*. New York: Secker & Warburg, 1962. b) Political ideologies are regularly described in the social science literature. See: Larrain, J. *The Concept of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson, 1979; McLellan, D. *Ideology*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986; Williams, H. *Concepts of Ideology*. New York: Wheatsheaf, 1988. Larrain, J. *The Concept of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson, 1979. c) See: Mitroff, I.I. *The Subjective Side of Science*. New York: Elsevier, 1974; Kinston, W. A total framework for inquiry. *Systems Research*, 5: 9-25, 1988.
3. The two main protagonists were C. Lindblom (e.g. The science of "muddling through". *Public Administration Review*, 19: 79-88, 1959) and Dror, Y. (e.g. Muddling through — science or inertia. *Public Administration Review*, 24: 154, 1964).
4. In the U.K., where many Islamic communities have become culturally isolated, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) mounted seminars and published Discussion Papers to enable these debates. e.g. *Law, Blasphemy and the Multi-faith Society*. CRE and the Inter-Faith Network; *Free Speech*. CRE and Policy Studies Institute; *Britain: A Plural Society*. CRE and The Runnymede Trust. (All published in London by the CRE, 1990.)
5. Anshen, R.N. (ed.) *Moral Principles of Action: Man's Ethical Imperative*. Vol. 6 in the Science of Culture Series. New York: Harper, 1953; Findlay, J.N. *Values and Intentions. A Study in Value Theory and Philosophy of Mind*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961; Maslow, A. *Toward a Psychology of Being*. (2nd Ed.) Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1968.
6. For philosophical dismissals, see: Zink, S. *The Concepts of Ethics*. London: Macmillan, 1962; and Mackie, J.L. *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. The theologian's quotation is from: Grisez, G. & Shaw, R. *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibility of Freedom*. London: Notre Dame University Press, 1974, p.104.
7. Keats, J. Ode to a Grecian Urn. In: Bullett G. (ed.) *John Keat's Poems*. London: Dent, 1964.
8. See, for example: Urban, W.M. *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*. New York, 1909. Findlay, J.N. *Axiological Ethics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970.
9. Bringing values under the wing of science is a vexed issue. Attempts have been made e.g. Perry, R.B. *Realms of Value*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1954; Handy, R. *Value Theory and the Behavioral Sciences*. Springfield, IL.: Charles C. Thomas, 1969. A rather general hierarchy of forms of value has been noted by some e.g. Albert, E.M. The classification of values: A method and illustration. *American Anthropologist*, 58: 221-248, 1956; Kluckhohn, C. et al. Values and value-orientations in the theory of action: An exploration in definition and classification. In: Parson, T. & Shils, E. (eds.) *Toward a General Theory of Action*. p.388-433. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1952. The present framework is offered as a new scientific approach.
10. Philosophers like J. Finnis home in on social values cf. *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Empiricists like J. Dewey prefer internal priorities cf. *The Theory of Valuation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Ideologues like Althusser affirm value systems cf. op. cit. [1]. Theologians like Buber concentrate on ultimate values cf. *Between Man and Man*. (transl. R. Smith) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1947. Few seem to emphasize principal objects as values.
11. See, for example: Grisez, G. & Shaw, R. op. cit. [6].
12. For an amusing account of an attempt to use a value system to run a business, see: Chippindale, P. & Horrie, C. *Disaster! The Rise and Fall of the News on Sunday: Anatomy of a Business Failure*. London: Sphere Books, 1988.
13. The first list comes from: Finnis, J. *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. The second list comes from: Grisez, G. *Christian Moral Principles*. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983.
14. Editorial. Blowing the whistle on accountancy. *The Economist*, 22 December 1990, p.16.
15. Two classic texts emphasizing the importance of the decision to participate in an organization are: Simon, H.A. *Administrative Behaviour*. New York: Macmillan 1957; Hirschman, A.O. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
16. This point is made convincingly by Ken Wilber in: *Up from Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution*. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1983.
17. For example, see: Rauschnig, H. *Revolution of Nihilism*. London: Arno Press, 1990; Kogon, E. *The Theory and Practice of Hell*. New York: Berkeley Medallion, 1958.
18. Many theologians, philosophers and psychologists have noted this feature of evil. See, for example: Fromm, E. *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
19. This has led to an ethics oriented to situations: e.g. Fletcher, J. *Situation Ethics*. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966.
20. Zagorin, P. *Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution and Conformity in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
21. See: Mead, M. (ed.) *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*. New York: Mentor, 1955, Ch. 2 p.126-150.
22. Zaehner, R.C. *The Teachings of the Magi*. London, 1966. Quotation taken from p. 25.